New hurdles between Lebanon and Israel for an agreement on the maritime delimitation
The Lebanon-Israeli agreement on the demarcation of maritime borders in the Eastern Mediterranean seemed to have reached a turning point in its development. On Sunday 2, Tel Aviv and Beirut accepted the proposal submitted by the US Senior Advisor for Energy Security, Amos Hochstein. After a week, however, Israel officially rejected the Lebanon’s proposed changes to the deal throwing years of diplomatic efforts away.
The dispute refers to a 860 km² area running from Rosh Hanikra to the West that both countries consider as a part of their exclusive economic zone. At stakes is an entire triangle full of oil and gas deposits. The dispute would concern in particular the offshore Karish and Kana natural gas fields. According to the US proposal, Israel would keep the full ownership over the Karish gas field and a portion of the Kana field, whereas Lebanon would take control of the remained part of Kana. Initially, Lebanon did not lay claims to the Karish gas filed, but it successively requested some revisions to the draft deal, which mainly related to the Karish gas filed. The success of the agreement has then been jeopardised by more complex and enduring factors. Specifically, the two countries have no diplomatic relations and, formally, are still at war. The 2006 conflict was stopped by the UN Security Council Resolution 1710 which established a ceasefire, subsequently never turned into a peace treaty.
Nevertheless, expectations were high as the agreement would have strengthen the Israeli economy after that the Tamar and Leviathan sub-sea gas fields were shut down; but it would have also fed a political opposition led by the former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu who has surged ahead in the national polls of November’s vote. Unsurprisingly, the rejection of Lebanon’s demands did not change Israeli plans to start the drilling operations in the Karish gas field. In a wider perspective, the Israeli State has largely benefited from Lebanese political impasse by performing some operations in the disputed area, as was in June 2022 when it deployed a floating platform for gas extraction.
On the Lebanese side, its political paralysis and the corruption of institutional apparatus would continue acting as deterrent, thus, compromising any future deals on maritime borders. In the meantime, as happened during the last summer, Hezbollah might threaten to target Israeli offshore gas platforms whose operations infringe Lebanese maritime rights. This would crucially reinforce the Israeli animosity that sees the Party of God (and Iran) as the main security threat in the Middle East. The Lebanese inexperience in the energy sector should then take into account: it would not compromise the operations, but would rather be used by Israel to advance its interests during future negotiation processes. In fact, the Lebanese State is a relatively new actor among the existing energy companies: the Lebanon Petroleum Administration obtained its operating license only in 2017.
Once again, the rivalry between Lebanon and Israel will slow down the gas exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean.