Egypt and the development of its national Navy: how Cairo is responding to the new challenges of the Mediterranean and the Red Sea
Since the electoral victory of President Al-Sisi in 2014, Egypt has undertaken a long process of revision of its foreign and security policy towards the MENA region. Cairo has indeed worked to increase its role within the regional scenario, to present itself as a strategic interlocutor in the area. However, the desire to return to a status of prestige within the international arena was soon confronted with a regional scenario in rapid evolution, populated by new and complex threats, a growing level of tension and several crises, located both in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the Red Sea area. In the light of this situation, Egypt urged the necessity to undertake an ambitious program for the development of its military capabilities, to support a vibrant foreign policy agenda and to protect the country’s strategic interests.
With regards to the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, the discovery of numerous natural gas fields, as well as the absence of a hegemonic actor able to ensure the stability of the balance of power, have given rise to tough competition between coastal countries for access to natural resources. In particular, the assertiveness demonstrated by Turkish foreign policy, followed by a vast program of modernization of its maritime military instrument, has rekindled the historical rivalry between Ankara and Cairo. The raising level of tension in the Eastern Mediterranean has pushed Egypt in particular to develop greater projection and patrolling capabilities, both for general deterrence and for ensuring greater control over its strategic infrastructure such as its off-shore energy platforms. A case in point is the Zohr field, managed by ENI, that currently meets about 40% of Egyptian energy needs.
At the same time, the security situation in the Red Sea has progressively deteriorated. At a macroscopic level, it can be seen how regional balances have become increasingly fragile in recent years, both on the Arabian Peninsula and in the Horn of Africa. It was therefore possible to witness a progressive militarization of the area: more and more external actors have installed and expanded military infrastructure in countries such as Djibouti, Eritrea and Somalia, thus increasing their activism in the region and the proliferation of military facilities in the area. In addition to criminal activities, piracy and terrorist proliferation which have always contributed to the destabilization of the Red Sea waters, the problematic Iranian presence has intensified in the last five years thus creating further complication to the security situation. Indeed, Tehran is now interested in challenging the sea control maintained by the main regional and international security providers. Its strategy consists in using its own proxy, namely the Yemenite Houthi militias and their naval component, to carry out actions of disturbance, sabotage, and naval guerrilla in the Red Sea. These actions represent for Egypt a considerable threat, not only from a security point of view, but also from economic one, since the country, among other things, manages the main crossing point for trade between Europe and Asia through the Red Sea, namely the Suez Canal. Through the Red Sea are transported daily goods directed to the Mediterranean for a value of approximately ten billion dollars and as witnessed by recent events, any blocking of this flow could cause significant damage to the entire world economy.
The renewed instability of the regional context and the growing need to defend its strategic interests within the maritime domain, have brought the Egyptian Navy to face its structural limits. Considering the level of obsolescence of its naval assets and the general lack of infrastructures, Cairo has recently embarked on a program of capacity building, installation of new naval bases and acquisition of new platforms. At a macroscopic level, Egypt wants to increase its deterrence and power projection capabilities, equipping itself with a blue water fleet able to operate efficiently outside its territorial waters, in a space that hypothetically extends from the Western Mediterranean to the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb.
The main pillar of this program concerns the enlargement of some existing military infrastructures, as well as the construction of new naval bases in certain strategic points, thus extending the operational extension of the Navy, therefore the Egyptian influence in the area. A clear example is the inauguration of the naval base of Barnis (Berenice) on the east coast of the country, which took place in December 2020. The base, already existing, has been enlarged to be able to host a greater number of vehicles of the Egyptian Navy, Air Force and Army. The main changes included the construction of new hangars for aircraft maintenance, a military hospital and a third runway with a length of 3000 meters. In addition, a new wharf was built, reaching 14 meters deep water, thus making the base able to accommodate large ships and submarines. The installation, located in a strategic point on the southern coast of Egypt, will become a very important logistical and operational base for the surveillance and security of the Red Sea waters off Sudan, where recently several foreign players, primarily Turkey in Saukin and Russia in Port Sudan, are investing significant resources to build new military bases.
At the same time, on the Mediterranean side, the Ras Gargoub base, not far from the Libyan border, is under construction. First, the choice of the place reflects the need to increase the security of its territorial waters near Libya, also responding to the widening of the conflict in the maritime domain and to the growing illegal traffics that affect the area. Secondly, the new base will serve Cairo as a new support point to better manage the patrolling activities and the defense of its offshore energy interests and of its maritime borders, in the light of the growing Turkish assertiveness.
On the other hand, ss far as procurement activities are concerned, Egypt is today facing a significant level of obsolescence of its fleet. Indeed, there Egypt urges the need to replace several platforms dating back to the 1970s and 1980s, such as U.S.-made Knox-class frigates or Spanish Descubierta-class corvettes, while at the same time it needs to increase the deep-sea vessels for the creation a real blue water fleet.
The acquisition program achieved a breakthrough between 2014 and 2015 with the purchase of two French-made Mistral-class amphibious assault helicopter carriers (LHDs). The purchase of the two units, which sale was denied to Russia following the events in Crimea, enabled the Egyptian Navy to become the first Arab navy to possess such amphibious projection and landing capabilities. In the same year, Egypt also purchased four Godwind-class multi-mission corvettes from France. The last of the series was delivered this year and was entirely manufactured in Egypt by Alexandria Naval for Maintenance and Industry. The peculiarity of the agreement with Francewas that one of the ships was meant to be built locally thus transferring industrial know-how crucial for the development of the Egyptian shipbuilding industry. All four corvettes are equipped with a discrete missile suite produced by MBDA, consisting of MICA anti-aircraft missiles and Exocet MM40 anti-ship missiles.
Over the years, Egypt has also increased orders from Germany, turning Berlin into one of its main partners in the defense sector. According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Egypt was the largest importer of German military technology among all Arab countries in 2019. Also in 2019, Cairo purchased four MEKO A-200EN-class frigates. These platforms are going to improve significantly the extend of Egyptian Navy operational range and other capabilities, mainly thanks to their anti-submarine and air defense functions. Also, this contract, like the one previously stipulated with France, foresees that one of the commissioned ships will be built locally with French technological support. In addition to this, Egypt has again relied on Germany for the purchase of a new coastal patrol vessel and patrol boats type TNC 35 and FPB 38, produced by the Lürssen industry, which will further increase the patrolling and protection capabilities of its coasts.
Finally, during 2020, Egypt purchased two Italian FREMMs, built by Fincantieri initially intended for the Italian Navy. The sale of this General Purpose frigates, represents not only an important showcase for the launch of the Italian military shipbuilding industry within the Arab world, but also provides the Egyptian Navy with two platforms that considered the highest performing and most technologically advanced on the market. Presumably, the two FREMM will provide an important deterrence capability and the possibility of a rapid and flexible use of the naval instrument for the defense of its territorial and energy interests, with reference to the growing competition with Turkey. Egypt has also recently relied on Italy for the purchase of 32 medium utility helicopters: twenty-four AW149 and eight AW189 produced by Leonardo. It is not yet clear how Egypt will dispose of these new assets, but a potential use on its two Mistral class LHDs cannot be excluded.
As most of the countries on the south-eastern shore of the Mediterranean, Egypt is also concerned about renewing and expanding its submarine component, also in the face of an undeniable recrudescence of the phenomenon of proliferation and activity of submarine vessels within the Mediterranean. Compared to an obsolete fleet composed of four Romeo class SSKs of Chinese import, dating back to the 80’s, Cairo is now acquiring four diesel-electric submarines type 209/1400mod of German manufacture. Of the boats, armed with heavy SeaHake mod 4 torpedoes and Harpoon Block II UGM-84L anti-ship missiles, three were delivered between 2017 and 2020, while the last one is scheduled to be delivered by the end of this year. The underwater component plays a particularly relevant role in the defense of Egyptian strategic interests, not only for the security of the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, but especially for the monitoring and protection of submarine cables. Indeed, all the data traffic from Europe to the Gulf and to Central Asia passes from Suez, thus making the choke-point a further nerve center for the global economy in the near future.
Although Egypt has long boasted a significant maritime military tradition, as well as one of the main fleets in the Arab world, in the past decades the internal upheavals in the country, the geopolitical situation and the heavy financial problems, have caused the Egyptian Navy to accumulate obsolescence and structural gaps. With Cairo’s return to an active and, in some ways, expansive foreign policy within the enlarged Mediterranean basin, it now feels the need for a Navy capable of operating over long distances, in an increasingly less permissive environment, within contested spaces across multiple domains. Recent acquisitions indicate that Egypt is not simply modernizing its fleet in a conservative way, but is trying to change its structure and approach, to have a complete and efficient blue water navy. This offshore capability will allow the country not only to better protect its strategic interests and territorial claims, but also to defend its maritime borders (in case the Libyan conflict should flare up again) to compete with Turkey in the energy game of the Eastern Mediterranean, to operate along the entire Red Sea basin and beyond, as well as to increase its regional influence through the military instrument. Therefore, the selection of certain industrial interlocutors along the procurement process, particularly for the largest platforms, is often functional to this agenda and proves to be a useful tool to consolidate key international relations and make Egypt an increasingly strategic interlocutor within the MENA area.
