The use of Iranian drones in the Russo-Ukrainian war
On October 18, Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky denounced how Russia’s systematic missile campaign aimed at the country’s strategic civilian infrastructure brought down 30% of its power plants, creating massive power outages in the run-up to incoming winter season. The missile escalation, a direct consequence of the sabotage of the Kerch Bridge by the Ukrainian services, has given renewed vigor to Moscow’s air campaign and has seen the use of different types of missiles as well as drones supplied by Iran.
Alongside the Kalibr family’s cruise missiles (both ship- and submarine-launched), the Kh-101 and Kh-55 air-launched carriers, and the Iskander and Tochka short-range ballistic missiles, a large proportion of Iranian Shahed-136 loitering ammunition was also employed.
The use of the latter, although already widely documented in previous weeks and thus not an absolute novelty, has brought to light several factors, first of all Russia’s growing dependency on foreign drones.
Although the Russian aeronautics industry is one of the few capable of building a complex aviation system in complete autonomy, the latter has accumulated a growing capacity gap in the field of unmanned aircrafts, particularly those in the MALE (Medium Altitude Long Endurance) category. The chronic lack of funds, the country’s endemic corruption, the lack of access to key technologies and a preference for heavier manned platforms are one of the main causes of this delay.
However, it should be pointed out that in the field of tactical drones, Russia is deploying systems of some value and at least partly comparable to their Western counterparts, such as the Orlan-10 and the loitering ammunitions of the ZALA family. Here again, however, the effectiveness of Ukraine’s countermeasures limited their operational impact.
Russia’s limited industrial capabilities in this field and the limited presence of MALE drones such as the Orion have meant that Russia has had to turn to its allies to replenish its ranks and acquire capabilities that have not yet been fully acquired. The purchase of Iran’s Mohajer-6 drone is a direct result.
The Mohajer-6 is the last drone of the Mohajer family. Characterized by a range of 12 hours, a top speed of 200 km/h, an operating range of about 2000 km, a tangent of 5500m and a payload of 40 kg, the Mohajer-6 can perform both ISR (Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance) and ground strike roles thanks to the electro-optical turret it is equipped with and the ability of carrying a pair of Qaem family guided ordnance. At least one specimen appears to have been lost in action near Odessa and recovered by Ukrainian forces.
Iranian supplies are also critical in the face of another factor that has been called into question several times in recent months: the ability to sustain a strategic missile campaign against Ukraine.
In order to cope with the inability of its aviation to achieve aerial superiority, mainly due to deficiencies in training, doctrine and the lack of guided ammunition, Russia had to resort to extensive use of stand-off weapons in order to hit sensitive targets deep in Ukrainian territory.
However, the massive use of air-launched and embarked ballistic and cruise missiles is not having the desired effect due to the latters relative inaccuracy and the high rate of missile launch failure and interception by Ukraine (around 40-50% according to Kiev sources), not to mention the high unit cost of the vector used in relation to the value of the designed targets (mainly civilian). Moreover, missile reserves, which must be kept at an acceptable level in the event of a possible expansion of the conflict or for contingency situations, appear to be particularly low according to many Western intelligence sources, not least in view of the sanctionatory regime applied to Russia, which has had a negative impact on the production capacity of Moscow’s war industry.
In this regard, a valid alternative has been found in the purchase of Iranian drones of the “loitering ammunition” type, specifically the Shahed-136, which offer a solution characterized by an excellent cost-effectiveness ratio. These small aircrafts are very light, powered by a small combustion engine of Chinese origin and are made of inexpensive composite materials. Equipped with GPS satellite navigation sensors (probably integrated by the Russian equivalent GLONASS) – but not with electro-optical turrets – and a 50 kg warhead, they are able to strike at large distances, about 1800 km, mainly stationary targets with sufficient precision. Their flight profile, at medium-low altitudes, and their small size, makes them difficult targets to shoot down for anti-aircraft systems, especially if used in large quantities and by different directions in order to saturate opposing defenses, thus enabling them to pave the way for the more expensive cruise missiles. The Shahed-136, renamed Geran-2 by the Russians, are also easy to use and characterized by a low unit cost due to their production simplicity and the use of components easily available on the global market.
Purchased by the hundreds, according to Western intelligence services, and deployed along all the front line as well as in Belarus, they have so far proved to be fairly effective. Depending on single raids, the Ukrainians are claiming to be able to shoot down a large number of Shahed-136s, also thanks to the new anti-aircraft, anti-drone and anti-missile defense systems received from the West; however, a fair amount of loitering ammunitions manages to pierce the Ukrainian air defense network, hitting pre-set targets. It should be noted that Iranian technicians may be present in Ukraine to support Moscow’s troops, and that several Russian operators have been trained for weeks in Iran to use them. From this point of view, the presence of Iranian experts on the ground (it seems to be mainly circumscribed to Crimea) could also be aimed at gaining a better understanding of the real effectiveness of these systems, to draw some preliminary and immediate learned lessons and to refine the use of these systems, as well as to understand how to further improve the performance of drones in terms of design, research and development, in order to transmit this information at home and produce new, better versions.
The use of Shahed-136 loitering ammunition goes hand in hand with the choice of targets to hit. By attacking critical infrastructure such as power plants and water plants, the Russians are trying to deprive the civilian population of electricity and heat sources, as well as running water, for intimidating purposes, but also to deprive the Ukrainian economy of the productive capacity of industry, particularly defence companies, in order to slow down as much as possible, the production of new systems weapons and ammunition, as well as the repair of vehicles damaged in combat. The psychological-intimidatory element, also represented by the specific targeting of Ukrainian national symbols, is thus a central factor in Russia’s strategy. To this end, Iranian drones offer a low-cost solution capable of saturating Ukraine’s anti-aircraft defences, allowing them to strike civilian targets and terrorizing the Ukrainian population.
In addition, it should be stressed that if the Iranians were to transfer the technical know-how relating the production of these drones to the Russians, the latter’s ability to set up an autonomous production line would be extremely important and could significantly support Moscow’s war effort in this specific area. The Russian industry could thus manufacture hundreds of drones per month, given the relative ease of production and the low cost of the Shahed-136.
Finally, with regard to Tehran, it is important to point out that the Middle East country has been able, over the last few decades, to launch and develop a major national programme for the design and construction of unmanned systems, a programme whose origins date back to the Iran-Iraq war, during which the first Iranian suicide drone, the Ababil, was deployed. Over the years, Iran has continued to invest significant resources in this programme, also as a partial alternative to the design and development of more complex and expensive systems, such as piloted aircrafts, an activity severely constrained by Western sanctions. As for Iran’s motives for supporting Russia’s war effort, there could be many reasons. First of all, the use of domestically produced drones in a high-intensity conflict such as the Russo-Ukrainian conflict makes it possible to validate the effectiveness of unmanned systems in the field, their operational doctrine and use, as well as to demonstrate to the world Iran’s industrial and technological capabilities, also with a view to exporting to other customers. Secondly, the ideological positioning alongside Russia reinforces the message and vision to which Iran too adheres, namely that of a multipolar world linked to values opposed to those of Western democracies, in which an alternative international order to that centred on the United States is being sought. Finally, the aid given to Russia could be repaid through greater international recognition, concessions on issues of national interest (as in Syria), aid, cooperation and military exchanges in areas where Iran is most deficient (e. g. the aeronautics industry and the manufacture and/or purchase of complex piloted aircraft at a discount price).