The underwater (almost) domain: dependencies, threats and prospects for protecting, operating and excelling in the abyss.
Defence & Security

The underwater (almost) domain: dependencies, threats and prospects for protecting, operating and excelling in the abyss

By Marco Di Liddo and Emmanuele Panero
06.17.2024

In recent years, the submarine environment has become increasingly important, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, with the emergence of the concept of Underwater Domain Awareness. This relates to an awareness of the security risks associated with increasing human dependence and activity in the deep sea and the possibility that they may be subject to malicious surveillance or attack. Moreover, it relates to the opportunities that adversary actors could take, operating below the surface, in the absence of adequate control of the submarine environment, conducting actions contrary to national security and interests, thus affecting the performance of economic, commercial, civil and military activities. Corridors related to energy supply, mineral resources, connectivity, gas and oil pipelines, and data traffic transmission backbones make the underwater environment strategic in many aspects and as such vulnerable to the influence of competitors. The return of a high-intensity conventional conflict with effects and lessons learned also in the maritime domain, as well as the sabotage of the Nord Stream gas pipelines in the Baltic Sea or the digital communication cables in the Barents Sea, have made clear the relevance of this (almost) domain also for the coastal countries of the European region. This implies an appropriate reflection on the vulnerabilities of strategic assets located on the seabed, the threats (espionage, hybrid or kinetic) to which these infrastructures are exposed, and the new requirements needed to operate, monitor and project capabilities below the surface. Indeed, the Mediterranean is increasingly a contested and chaotic sea, where numerous regional actors aspire to control and exploit increasing portions of the deep sea, and where disagreements between some states over their respective Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) are driving growing activity of surface and especially submarine assets to monitor activities below and above the sea. Finally, the increase in the number and activities of the Russian fleet in the Mare Nostrum poses significant questions of effective deterrence and the scalability of surveillance and potential competition tools, posing an undeniable threat to national, European and Atlantic security. In line with the challenges posed by acting in the underwater environment, the Budget Act has provided for the annual allocation of 2 million euro from 2023 for the construction and development of a National Centre of Excellence in La Spezia, under the supervision and control of the Italian Navy. The ultimate objective of the newly established centre is the enhancement of the national underwater sector, also implying the updating of the Code of Military Regulations, assigning the Navy the task of promoting the sector’s potential and competitiveness while fostering its related technical-scientific research activities, as well as supporting its innovations and intellectual property. In fact, the subsurface dimension is of great importance to the Italian Republic due to the presence of key civil infrastructures, with the Navy playing an essential role in protecting communication routes and underwater infrastructures through submarines and other means, including unmanned ones such as underwater drones, which represent a leading high-tech and defence-industrial achievement. Undersea environment then offers a possible sphere of action and manoeuvre, in which the dedicated components of the Armed Forces, especially the Navy, can extend their projection capabilities, developing doctrines and instruments suitable for controlling and influencing, if necessary, what lies below and above the surface or overlooking it from the coast. Determining the level of dependence on submarine infrastructure is therefore a fundamental prerequisite for an analysis of the different threats that can disrupt or damage these assets, and at the same time a starting point for identifying the capacity requirements to operate and excel in the underwater (almost) domain as Armed Forces, Defence Industry and Country-System.

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