The Asifah Brigade's role in the conflict in Yemen

Yemen is undergoing a deep social, economic, and political crisis. The current civil war, which erupted in 2015, is being fought between President Hadi’s government forces, backed by a Saudi-led international coalition, and the Houthi rebels, whom, in turn, are being sponsored by Iran. In addition to these two factions, there are several secessionist political parties linked to the various Yemeni territorial realities, which, although opportunistically, also support the two main factions. In such a fragile environment, it has been possible, in recent months, to witness the progressive exacerbation of some trends that were already taking place within the country. In fact, the protracted fighting has led to the deterioration of the humanitarian situation, which was then exacerbated by the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic. Yemen has also suffered a stalemate in the peace talks promoted by the Riyadh Treaty, signed in the Saudi capital on the 5th November 2019, but that never really came into force. With its declaration of ‘autonomy’ of the 26th April, in fact, the Southern Transition Council (STC), a secessionist party leading the southern part of Yemen, joined the list of groups currently at war for control of the country.

At such a critical time, Yemen thus represents a fertile ground for the development of new armed groups that, despite still being too small to be ‘detected’ by the radars of the most prominent media outlets, are establishing themselves as crucial actors in the complex Yemeni scenario. Among them is the Asifah Brigade. This group has recorded important field victories at the southern end of the country and, having for now concentrated its operations in the port city of Aden, it has quickly established itself as a crucial player in the current interim capital of the country. By virtue of being affiliated with the Southern Transitional Council, however, the growing power wielded by the Asifah Brigade worries President Hadi’s government.

Although only coming to the fore last April, when it managed to seize some parts of Aden’s critical infrastructure in the wake of STC’ declaration of ‘autonomy’, the birth of the Asifah Brigade actually dates to the beginning of 2018. The group emerges from the ranks of the Security Belt, an elite paramilitary force serving the Southern Transition Council that had, up to that point, conducted its operations in the governorates of Aden, Lahij and Abyan. The Brigade, through a progressive expansion of the area of operations, then managed to establish itself as the largest security provider in the Aden area. The leadership of the group resides solely in the hands of Awssan Fadl al-Anshali, former Commander of the personal guard of the current President of the STC, Aidarus al-Zubaidi. The latter, in turn, had previously served as Governor of Aden.

However, both figures are originally from the ad-Dali Governorate. From there, all members of the armed group are also recruited, thus rendering it an external force to the dynamics of Aden. Nevertheless, the relationship between the Southern Transition Council and the Asifah Brigade is quasi-symbiotic, insofar as the armed group continues to act as the armed executive of the secessionist party. However, while al-Anshali was, until recently, al-Zubaidi’s right-hand man, the group’s on-the-ground victories have entrusted onto the Brigade’s leader a greater role within Aden’s power dynamics. Hence, al-Anshali today represents the most important strategic partner to the STC leadership within the city.

However, the Asifah Brigade’s ties reach far beyond Aden. Its leader maintains active relations with the family of Yemen’s former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh. Although the birth and evolution of the Asifah Brigade are both so intimately linked to the STC, relations between al-Anshali and Yahya Muhammad Abdullah Saleh, one of Ali Abdullah’s sons, betrays greater ambitions. The Saleh family leads one of the three factions of the General People’s Congress (CGP), one of Yemen’s main political parties. While the pro-Saleh faction of the CGP is officially an ally to with President Hadi, the group appears determined to replace the latter in the country’s leadership. As such, given the current position of power held by the Asifah Brigade in the city of Aden, a potential axis between al-Anshali and the Saleh family could give this CGP faction a considerable strategic advantage. This, however, would set out a difficult coexistence with the Southern Transitional Council, which has staked all its cards on the control of the city and which, albeit for the moment, has managed to obtain it mainly through al-Anshali’s blessing. Amid such a complex mechanism, it should be remembered that the Asifah Brigade emerges as the only player strong enough to guarantee a possible partner control of Yemen’s interim capitol.

In light of the links between the Asifah Brigade and the Saleh family, it is thus reasonable to assume an alliance, albeit possibly only a temporary one, between the Southern Transition Council and the CGP faction led by another son of Yemen’s former President, Ahmed Saleh. Together with his brothers, Ahmed in fact strives to rebuild the network of alliances that his father had managed to weave with different tribes and confederations present mainly in the western highlands of the country. If the southern secessionist movement develops ambitions more nationalistic in scope, or if it finds convenience in fomenting divisions within Hadi’s party, the Saleh family could become an interesting prospect of partnerships for the STC.

At the moment, however, the focus remains on Aden. While it is true that last July the Southern Transitional Council abandoned the claim for autonomy in the southern part of the country, having failed to exercise its control over the pro-Hadi provinces bordering the east, it was nevertheless able to ensure that its Secretary General, Ahmad Lamlas, was appointed as the new governor of Aden. Currently, therefore, al-Zubaidi party remains fully in control of the city.

However, the ability to exercise this control over time will greatly depend on Al Zubaidi’s ability to unite his separatist ambitions with the promise of implementing the Saudi-sponsored Riyadh Treaty that, in and of itself, was intended for a successful peace-brokering between these two factions. Yet, on the one hand, Saudi partners are pushing for the normalization of relations between Hadi’s forces and al-Zubaidi, in the hope of drawing attention to the common Houthi enemy. On the other hand, the STC, a spokesman for well-established independence claims in southern Yemen, which was an independent Republic from 1967 to 1990, maintains a strong anti-government position, making détente between the two factions a far from stable situation. For this reason, if the clashes between the two forces resume, it cannot be ruled out that the Asifah Brigade could revise its alignment if a change guaranteed greater political expediency. If the STC loses negotiating power at national level, then, the group could be led to consider other partnerships, particularly with the pro-Saleh faction of the CGP, to be more beneficial. The next few months will therefore be decisive in understanding Aden’s future. To this day, the fate of the city still appears to be strongly linked to that of the Asifah Brigade and to the quality of its relations with the Southern Transition Council. In a phase of the Yemeni conflict characterized by great fickleness, the role that the Asifah Brigade has managed to carve out within Aden, thanks in part to the control of the refineries, port and airport of the city, has relevance not only at the local level, but also on the negotiating capacity of the STC. More generally, in fact, it will be able to influence the progress of the dialogue to implement the Riyadh Treaty and restore cohesion to the anti-Houthi front.